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In the post-World  War I1 era, the U.S. textile and apparel industries achieved 
a degree of  protection  that was unparalleled in the rest of the manufacturing 
sector. Although textiles and apparel together employ less than 2 percent of the 
total labor force, they account for over 80 percent of the net cost of all import 
restrictions in the United States (Hufbauer and Elliott  1994). This industry’s 
unusual success in attaining import protection is also evident from the fact that 
it was the only manufacturing sector to win a multilateral quota arrangement 
sanctioned by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).’ 
Our focus in this paper is on the mechanics of domestic protection: on the 
laws that gave the executive branch the authority to restrict textile imports and 
on the executive branch’s implementation of that authority. We emphasize these 
dimensions for two reasons: (1) the more visible conflicts between nations over 
the international agreements to restrict textile and apparel trade have been ex- 
tensively and skillfully studied, and (2) overlooking the mechanics of how pro- 
tection was put in place leads one to overlook one of the most powerful actors 
in the story-the  state itself. In determining the scope and magnitude of pro- 
tection to U.S. textile and garment interests, the U.S. government was more 
than a neutral  intermediary. It was one of  the most influential players in the 
game. 
4.1  Winning Protection: The Early Years 
During the  1950s, imports of  cotton textiles increased rapidly, and by  the 
end of the decade imports accounted for over one-third of the U.S. market in 
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several important product categories. These import surges prompted  inflam- 
matory  stitements against Japanese exports and an occasional congressional 
bill to impose quotas or other limits. 
There was little chance that such bills would gain approval. The lessons of 
the Smoot-Hawley tariff  were fresh in mind, and Congress was reluctant to 
take direct action to limit imports. There was even less chance that a protec- 
tionist  bill  could  avoid a presidential  veto. While Congress  perceived  trade 
policy as a means of helping local industry, the executive branch of the U.S. 
government saw trade policy as an important instrument of foreign policy. 
Influenced by Wilsonian ideals of the international rule of law and the popu- 
list idea that trading made good neighbors, the executive’s approach to trade 
policy was conditioned by two decades of progress. The executive branch had 
been in an almost continuous negotiation with its trading partners over trade 
restrictions.  Not just principle  but  conditioned  reflex  pushed  the  executive 
away from unilateral action on trade restrictions. 
Although such direct routes to more protection appeared to be unrealistic in 
the post-World  War I1 climate, Congress had also created several “administra- 
tive” routes to protection. These more indirect avenues for protection gave the 
president  authority  to restrict imports under  specific circumstances,  but  left 
him with the discretionary authority not to do  SO.^ These more indirect avenues 
allowed congressional representatives who faced demands for import protec- 
tion to direct constituents to the appropriate administrative mechani~m.~ 
4.1.1  The Textile Industry’s Strategy 
The effort to gain protection  was led by  textile interests, who were more 
affected  by  import competition.  than the apparel industry.  Manufacturers  of 
cotton textiles, who were most affected by  imports, played a particularly im- 
portant role. The industry’s strategy was the obvious one: to maintain pressure 
on all political fronts for direct protective measures and at the same time to 
use all available administrative remedies.  On the political front, the industry 
was active at public hearings concerning the U.S. government’s intentions to 
negotiate tariff reductions under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. 
The industry quickly learned that the executive was reluctant to limit im- 
ports. In  1955, 1959, and again in  1961, the American Textile Manufacturers 
2.  Even the Smoot-Hawley tariff provided for such administrative adjustment of tariffs. In a 
“Section 336” (of the Smoot-Hawley Act) the US.  Tariff Commission would conduct an investiga- 
tion to determine the cost of producing a product in the United States and in exporting countries. 
Based on that information, the Tariff Commission would then recommend to the president the rate 
change that would “equalize competition,” i.e., a tariff rate that would make the foreign cost plus 
the tariff equal to the domestic cost. Scction 336 allowed for tariff reductions as well as for in- 
creases. Over the twelve-year life of  the section (1930-1941)  most petitions for investigations 
were rejected (256 of 357). In almost half of the times the commission conducted an investigation, 
it recommended no change of the tariff. Of  101 investigations, 29 led to tariff increases, 25 to re- 
ductions. 
3. All eighty-one requests by  Congress for a Section 336 investigation were honored by  the 
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Institute (ATMI) petitioned the secretary of agriculture for broader import quo- 
tas under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.4  The Eisenhower ad- 
ministration  exploited the fact that there were no deadlines for a Section 22 
investigation and left the  1955 petition tied up in the secretary of agriculture’s 
preliminary investigation. The 1959 and 1961 petitions were thwarted in a dif- 
ferent way: the executive (the Eisenhower administration in 1959, the Kennedy 
administration in  1961) exploited its authority to draft the terms of reference 
for a Section 22 investigation, and focused the investigations on the impact of 
imports on the U.S. government’s agricultural export programs rather than on 
its domestic price or income support programs. Likewise, when the American 
Textile Manufacturers Institute asked for quotas on imports of cotton, synthetic 
fiber, silk, and wool products  under the  national  security provisions of the 
Trade Agreements Act, the executive took advantage of the absence of a time 
limit on such investigations and never announced a decision. A 1956 petition 
for “escape clause” relief came to a similar end, and it became evident that the 
executive would take advantage of whatever loopholes were available to pre- 
vent the trade remedy mechanisms from interfering with a US.  foreign policy 
that scorned restrictions on imports. 
4.1.2  The Opportunity That Paid Off 
By the fall of  1961, the Trade Expansion Act  (TEA) had become an im- 
portant part of President John F.  Kennedy’s agenda. To President Kennedy and 
his allies in the government, commercial diplomacy was first of  all a tool of 
foreign policy. Through a new round of GATT negotiations the president could 
build a relationship with the increasingly successful European Common Mar- 
ket, and thereby  renew the strategic alliance between the United States and 
Western Europe. Though the economics of the argument remained vague, the 
TEA also became the president’s response to pressures for action on the contin- 
uing US.  trade deficit and the gold drain. In addition, the Kennedy administra- 
tion  argued  that  the act would  stimulate the domestic  economy: it became 
something of a panacea for present problems and future circumstances, foreign 
and domestic. 
Yet  Kennedy needed support from a powerful southern delegation in Con- 
gress to pass the TEA. Textile protection was an issue on which the southern 
delegation  was  unified.  The textile  and  apparel  industries  were  by  far the 
largest providers of manufacturing jobs in the South, accounting for over half 
of total manufacturing employment in  several states. During his  1960 cam- 
paign, Kennedy pledged to make the cotton textile import problem a top prior- 
4. Section 22, added to the Agricultural Adjustment Act  on August 24, 1935, authorized the 
president to impose import fees or  quotas to restrict imports of agricultural commodities or the 
products thereof if those imports render or tend to render ineffective or materially interfere with 
U.S. agricultural programs. The section, by  design, was similar in scope and purpose to Section 
3(e) of  the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which authorized the president to limit im- 
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ity of his administration. Based on this pledge, the southern delegation bartered 
their support for the TEA against protection for the textile and apparel industry. 
To win their support for the bill, President Kennedy offered a seven-point pro- 
gram for textile and apparel protection. As a key element of this program, the 
State Department was directed to convene a conference of  textile importing 
and exporting countries to develop an international agreement governing tex- 
tile trade. 
U.S. participation in such negotiations would proceed  under the authority 
granted to the president under Section 204 of  the Agriculture Act  of  1956. 
Section 204 authorized the president to negotiate with foreign governments to 
limit the export to the United States of agricultural or textile products, and to 
carry out such an agreement by limiting the entry of such products  into the 
United States. Before the TEA came to a vote, the southern congressional dele- 
gation had pushed through an amendment to Section 204 that would give the 
president power, once agreement with some countries was in place, to restrict 
imports from countries nor party to the agreement. 
By  March  1962, Kennedy  had  implemented  or made  commitments  that 
would soon implement all seven points of his proposed program to help the 
industry. The Long Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles, which provided for 
protection  from imports  that  caused  or  threatened  market  disruption,  was 
signed in February  1962. In April  1962, acting under Section 204 authority, 
Kennedy embargoed  eight categories of  cotton textile  imports from Japan.5 
When the TEA came up for a vote in June 1962, an overwhelming majority of 
southerners in both the House and the Senate voted for the bill. 
4.2  The Origins and Implementation of the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement (MFA) 
Richard Nixon, running for the presidency in 1968, had learned from Ken- 
nedy’s experience about the power of  the textile industry. He pledged  in his 
campaign to negotiate an international agreement that would include wool and 
man-made fiber products. After the elections, the Nixon administration used 
Section 204 to expand the Long Term Arrangement. Section 204, as amended 
in  1962, provided a powerful weapon to force foreign countries to negotiate 
limits on their exports to the United States. It put the U.S. government in a 
position, once agreement had been reached with some countries, to threaten 
unilateral action against any country reluctant to come to terms. Section 204 
also made it difficult for exporting countries to unify to strengthen their negoti- 
ating position. After concluding agreements with  Hong Kong, South Korea, 
5. The industry in turn kept its part of the bargain. With these restrictions in place, the National 
Cotton Council and the American Textile Manufacturers Institute supported the TEA. Two-thirds 
of Congressman Carl Vinson’s Textiles Conference Group voted  for the bill and against critical 
amendments restricting the president’s negotiating authority. Eighty-two of  105 House southern 
Democrats voted for the TEA; in the Senate, 19 of 20 southerners. 47  Import Protection for U.S. Textiles and Apparel 
and Taiwan, the Nixon administration was in a position to take unilateral action 
against other exporters, and exporting-country opposition was chipped away.h 
The new agreement, known as the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), replaced 
the  Long Term Arrangement and  extended protection  to include both  wool 
and synthetics.’ 
The main operative provision of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, carried over 
from the Long Term Arrangement, was Article 3. Article 3 provided that when- 
ever imports of  a particular  product caused or threatened market disruption, 
the importing country could request the exporting country  to restrict  its ex- 
ports. While the Arrangement specified that the request for restraint be accom- 
panied by  a “detailed factual statement of the reasons for the request,” it im- 
plicitly  left  to  the  importing  country  the  authority  to  determine  when 
“disruption” was present or threatened. Other provisions identified the kinds 
of restrictions sanctioned under GATT, such as restrictions on products, growth 
in quotas, and other details. 
4.2.1  How Protection Is Administered 
Under the MFA, U.S. textile import restraints are administered by the Com- 
mittee for Implementation of the Textile Agreements (CITA). When the textile 
industry believes  that market  disruption  is occurring in a particular product 
category, the industry (usually through  its association, the American Textile 
Manufacturers Institute makes the facts known to CITA. CITA usually meets 
at the level of deputy assistant secretary (senior civil service), with the Com- 
merce Department representative  chairing. CITA then develops its own “dis- 
ruption statement,” on which the industry often comments. Those comments 
often include the provision of more up-to-date data on the state of the domestic 
industry, such as data on output, prices, or employment. 
If CITA concludes that market disruption is occurring, it issues a “call,” a 
notification to the exporting country that its exports of a particular product are 
causing market disruption. Following the notification,  a preliminary  quota is 
imposed. Under MFA guidelines, the U.S. government then enters into negoti- 
ations with the exporting country to agree on a final quota level. 
In the end, industry officials insist, there  is a loose relation  between the 
disruption statement and the quota level that is set. While the Commerce De- 
partment  administrators  are usually  sympathetic  to the  industry’s position, 
quota levels must win the approval of CITA, which includes two “general inter- 
est” departments, State and Treasury. Industry officials insist that even the ini- 
tial quota is often larger than the limit actually needed to stop market disrup- 
tion, and that the final level is often more than  twice the level of  the initial 
quota. During the first ten months of  1984, when imports surged as the dollar 
6. Brandis (1982, 43). 
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appreciated, the ATMI testified  that only one-third of the imports of uncon- 
trolled products that were causing market disruption and were eligible for a 
call under the MFA had in fact been called. 
Evidence from the 1980s confirms that the protection received by the indus- 
try is porous. Despite the fact that coverage of the MFA expanded significantly 
during this period, quota utilization rates were, on average, considerably below 
100 percent. Quota allocations, which grew at slightly below 6 percent annu- 
ally in real terms, grew at an even faster pace for some of the major exporters, 
such as China. 
Econometric analysis of  the pattern of quota allocation in the United States 
during the 1980s also shows that market disruption  was only one of several 
factors which affected quota determination. Empirical proxies for market dis- 
ruption (e.g., import penetration, loss of employment) were significant deter- 
minants of which products were under quota, but other factors were important 
as well. In particular, the faster-growing  and richer, industrializing countries 
were more likely to have quota restraints imposed on their exports, while im- 
portant markets for U.S. exports were less likely to face quota protection. 
4.2.2  Impact of  Protection 
The degree of protection won by the textile and apparel industries was sub- 
stantial. Although textiles and apparel account for less than 2 percent of total 
employment in the U.S. economy, protecting them against import competition 
accounts for 83 percent of the net cost to the U.S. economy of  all import re- 
strictions. Cline (1990) estimates that quotas as of  1986 provided the equiva- 
lent of a 28 percent tariff on textiles and a 53 percent tariff on apparel. Even 
so, imports have continued to capture an increasing share of the U.S. market. 
When the first international  textile arrangement  was concluded  in the early 
1960s, imports accounted for only 5 percent of the US. market for textiles, 
and an even smaller percentage of the U.S. market for apparel. By 1992, textile 
imports had risen to 20 percent of the U.S. market, while apparel imports ac- 
counted for 35 percent. 
4.3  Why Protection, Why VERs? Bad Economics 
The US. textile and apparel industry’s case for protection emphasized the 
loss of jobs and output by  U.S. workers  and businesses.  Resistance  to this 
pressure came from the executive branch of the U.S. government. Although the 
executive could  count on support from U.S. heavy  industry  and large U.S. 
banks when it sought authority to negotiate GATT for lower protection, U.S. 
business provided no direct opposition to textile industry petitions for protec- 
tion. The auto industry, for example, would support President Kennedy’s Trade 
Expansion Act, but it would not testify at an escape-clause or Section 22 inves- 
tigation that restrictions on textile exports would increase its costs and thereby 
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The political power of  southern textile interests, combined with a lack of 
opposition from other industries, meant that the executive branch was forced 
to make important concessions to the textile and apparel industries. These con- 
cessions were made in spite of the fact that the executive felt that foreign policy 
interests were best served by a policy of free trade. By the 1990s, however, the 
balance of power had shifted away from the textile and apparel interests. 
In 1994,  the U.S. government signed the Uruguay Round Agreement, which 
provides that all textile and apparel quotas will be eliminated within ten years. 
Yet this loss by the industry does not reflect any realization by the U.S. voting 
public or even the U.S. government that protecting textile and apparel products 
came at a significant cost to U.S. consumers. Rather, it reflects two unrelated 
factors. First, changes in congressional rules and southern voting patterns di- 
minished the southern delegation’s influence. Second, from a mercantilist per- 
spective, support turned against U.S. textile and apparel producers. Textile ex- 
porting countries are now valued as markets for services and technology-based 
products, hence the textile and apparel industry’s mercantilist  interests were 
traded for those of other US.  producers. 
Why were voluntary export restraints (VERs) used instead of tariffs? Al- 
though a VER is a higher-cost form of protection than a tariff, it was an instru- 
ment that accommodated the various influences that came together to shape 
protection. Pressure for protection from the textile industry was, of course, one 
of these influences, but there were counterpressures as well. In the 1930s, after 
the Smoot-Hawley tariff was enacted and other countries had retaliated, gov- 
ernments were wary of triggering further retaliation. Negotiation with the ex- 
porting country was the usual response to domestic pressure for increased pro- 
tection.  The success  of  the  Reciprocal  Trade Agreements program  and  the 
creation under U.S. leadership of GATT intensified the U.S. executive’s focus 
on  negotiation  as  the  way  of  establishing  trade  policy.  Along  with  these 
changes came an increased reluctance to limit U.S. imports, even through ne- 
gotiations. Under pressure, however, the executive would turn to the VER. A 
negotiated VER minimized the “costs” of protection-it  minimized harm to 
the foreign policy “relationship” that existed between the United States and 
the exporting country. 
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